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CEO equity incentive, board gender diversity, and share repurchases  
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the effect of CEO equity incentive on share repurchase. We 
further consider the influence of board gender diversity on the relation between CEO equity 
incentives and share repurchase. Using a sample of the Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei 
Exchange listed companies from 2002 to 2016, we document that, relative to lower equity 
incentive, CEOs with higher equity incentive are more likely to buy back shares, in particular 
when their stock prices are perceived as undervalued. Furthermore, we also find that board 
gender diversity mitigates the relation between CEO equity incentive and share buyback.  
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1. Introduction 
Existing literature examines whether CEO equity incentive affects share repurchases, 
but with mixed results. Some studies show that CEO equity incentive affects the amount of 
share repurchases in the United States and Europe. Repurchases are more likely in firms that 
have more equity incentive due to offset EPS dilution caused by the use of employee stock 
options (Fenn and Liang 2001; Kahle 2002; Bens et al. 2002; Burns, McTier and Minnick 
2015; Cheng, Harford and Zhang 2015; Tan and Young 2016; Kim and Ng 2018). However, 
other research finds a statistically insigniﬁcant relationship between repurchase activities and 
CEOs stock options or bonus (Liljeblom and Pasternack 2006; De Cesari and Ozkan 2015; 
Cheng, Harford and Zhang 2015). Therefore, clear evidence concerning the effect of CEO 
equity incentive on share repurchase is still lacking in the literature. Unlike prior research that 
only uses the percentage of CEO’s ownership or beneficial ownership (stock option or equity 
bonus as equity compensation) as a proxy for equity incentives, we follow Core and Guay 
(1999) to measure the CEO equity incentives as “the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change 
in firm value” which considers the relation between CEO’s personal ownership (including 
CEOs’ direct investment in a firm’s stock, as well as equity compensation) and firm value.1 
In this study, we aim to provide direct evidence as to whether CEO equity incentive affects 
repurchase.  
When CEOs have higher equity ownership, their welfare is directly tied to firm value. 
CEOs’ personal wealth changes as a result of share price changes; this provides equity 
incentive (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Core and Guay 1999; Sanders 2001). 
The closer the linkage between the personal wealth of CEOs and the share prices of the 
companies, the stronger the equity incentive effect of CEO ownership.
2
 High share prices 
generally lead to high value of the equity promised to the CEO. Therefore, CEOs concerned 
about their equity value are motived to promote firm value through share repurchase 
(Amihud and Lev 1981; Walking and Long 1984; Fried 2011) in order to increase the value 
of their own equity stake. This study expects that firms buy back shares more often when the 
CEOs have higher equity incentives, as measured by the change in CEO wealth for a 1% 
                                                 
1
 Compared to using the percentage of share CEO owned, Sanders (2001) suggests that the value of stock 
owned by a firm's CEO provides the wealth effect of CEO ownership. Core and Guay (1999) suggest that the 
explanatory power of the measure of CEO equity incentives is substantially greater than for an incentive 
measure that consists solely of CEOs’ ownership. 
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 We follow Core and Guay (1999) to measure the excess equity incentive which is the deviation between 
CEOs' holdings of equity incentives and optimal levels (see section 3).  
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change in firm value.  
Other than the CEOs equity incentive, the literature exploring the incentives for share 
repurchases documents positive economic incentives such as signaling undervalued share 
prices (Vermaelen 1981; Stephens and Weisbach 1998) and distribution of free cash flows 
(Jensen 1986; Stephens and Weisbach 1998).
3
 The former is called the information signaling 
hypothesis, which states that share repurchase announcements are a means of conveying 
positive information about future earnings prospects by reducing information asymmetry 
(Otchere and Ross 2002). The latter is called the free cash flow hypothesis, which suggests 
that repurchasing shares is a way to distribute a firm’s excess cash flow to avoid 
over-investment (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). According to these two hypotheses, the 
announcements for share repurchases may be viewed as a signal to investors about future 
performance, to which the market may respond favorably (Lie 2005; Liang, Chan, Lai and 
Wang 2013). However, the economic incentives (stock is undervalued or free cash flows) of 
share repurchases may differ for CEOs, depending on their self-interest motivations. The 
management incentive hypothesis contends that the higher the management remuneration or 
ownership, the more likely the announcements for share repurchases (Vafeas 1997; Jolls 
1998; Dittmar 2000; Fenn and Liang 2001; Kahle 2002; Bens et al. 2002; Tsai and Kou 2004; 
Chan, Tai, Chan and Li 2012; Burns, McTier and Minnick 2015). This suggests that 
managers intend to boost share prices and buy back shares for boosting their personal wealth 
(Jensen 2005). CEOs have higher propensity to repurchase shares when they believe the 
stocks are undervalued. Under this scenario, CEOs are motivated to enhance firm values and 
shareholding values via buying back shares. This paper further expects that CEOs with high 
equity incentive are more sensitive to undervaluation of firm values when making repurchase 
decisions.  
On the other hand, according to the free cash flow hypothesis, repurchases are more 
likely in firms that hold high levels of excess cash (e.g., Andriosopoulos and Hoque 2013). 
However, if CEOs equity incentives are high, the agency problem resulting from free cash 
flows will be mitigated (Haugen and Senbet 1981). This implies that CEOs’ equity incentives 
can mitigate the over-investment of free cash flow. We thus expect that CEOs with higher 
                                                 
3
 Other than the undervaluation of share prices and the redistribution of cash flows, the incentives of stock 
buybacks include an increase in debt ratios, anti-takeover measures (Dittmar 2000) and share issues (by using 
treasury stocks) to employees (Dittmar 2000; Chan, Tai, Chan and Li 2012). We consider these incentives by 
including them as control variables in the analyses.  
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equity incentive are less sensitive to excess free cash flow when making repurchase 
decisions. 
Prior research regarding CEOs’ equity incentives posits two competing effects: the 
interest alignment effect (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Holmstrom 
1979) and an opportunistic effect (or managerial entrenchment effect) (Vafeas 1997; 
Goldman and Slezak, 2006; Duellman, Ahmed and Abdel-Meguid 2013; Armstrong, Larcker, 
Ormazabal and Taylor 2013). Duellman et al. (2013) find that the incentive alignment 
(opportunistic) effect of equity incentives increases (decreases) as monitoring intensity 
increases (decreases). According to governance hypothesis, female directors allocate more 
effort to monitoring and improving corporate governance.
4
 CEOs’ opportunistic behavior 
decreases or the incentive alignment effect increases, in firms with high board gender 
diversity. This study further investigates whether board gender diversity affects the 
relationship between equity incentives and repurchases. 
Using a sample of the Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange listed companies 
from 2002 to 2016, the empirical results show that, on average, CEOs with higher equity 
incentive are more likely to buy back shares. In addition, the effect of CEO equity incentive 
on repurchase is more pronounced when the stock is undervalued, compared with the 
distribution of free cash flows. In other words, when CEOs have a closer linkage between 
their personal wealth and the share prices of the companies, they are more motivated to buy 
back stocks, especially when the stocks are undervalued. However, we do not find that this 
correlation exists in the free cash flow hypothesis. We also find that board gender diversity 
mitigates the correlation between CEO equity incentive and buyback, which is consistent 
with the governance hypothesis that CEOs’ opportunistic behavior decreases with board 
gender diversity. 
This paper adds to the body of research that investigates why firms repurchase stocks by 
considering the interaction of managers’ self-interest and economic incentives. Research in 
this area typically examines the repurchase motivations from either one view of economic 
incentives, such as undervalued share prices and the distributed free cash flows, or the other 
view of CEOs equity incentives. In contrast, we recognize that CEOs treat the economic 
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 Female directors improve monitoring (Adams and Ferreira 2009), reduce agency cost of equity (Gul et al. 
2001), and buy back shares to reduce agency costs of free cash flow (Evgeniou and Vermaelen 2017). 
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incentives different, especially when CEOs have high self-interest motivations.
5
 In addition, 
we use a more comprehensive measure of CEOs’ self-interest as the change in CEO wealth 
for a 1% change in firm value (Core and Guay 1999). This proxy allows us to directly 
measure the equity incentive of CEOs compared to the percentage of CEO ownership or 
equity compensation. Finally, we also find that boards with female directors are tougher 
monitors than all-male boards, as reﬂected by the use of share repurchase as a self-interest 
tool of CEOs, which is consistent with the governance hypothesis.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature 
review and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and variable 
measurement. Section 4 provides the empirical findings and interpretations. Section 5 
presents the conclusions and suggestions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
1) Literature review on share repurchases: motivations and performance 
Prior literature addressing share repurchases examines the following issues: (1) 
motivations of share repurchases; (2) market responses to share repurchase announcements; 
(3) long-term performance after share repurchase announcements. Most of the literature 
delving into the repurchase motivations documents positive economic incentives, such as 
companies having undervalued share prices, or excess free cash flows (Dittmar 2000; Tsai 
and Kuo 2004; Cheng, Lin and Hsu 2006). Other studies indicate that companies buy back 
shares as an anti-takeover measure when they are under the risk of being acquired (Dittmar 
2000). Some studies look at the issues from the managers’ self-interest motivation. The share 
repurchase propensity grows when a high percentage of shares owned by directors and 
supervisors are pledged (Cheng et al. 2006), the percentage of management ownership is high 
(Vafeas 1997; Jolls 1998; Dittmar 2000; Tsai and Kuo 2004), or the CEO also serves as a 
board director or chairperson (Chen and Le 2012). Young and Yang (2011), Tan and Young 
(2016) and Kim and Ng (2018) contend that if earnings per share (EPS) are used as a 
performance indicator in remuneration contracts, managers also tend to buy back shares to 
raise EPS and hence their compensation. However, different firm characteristics lead to 
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 Cheng et al. (2006) use listed firms in Taiwan to examine whether ownership by directors and supervisors 
affects the economic incentives of share repurchases. However, they do not consider the interaction effect of 
equity incentive and economics incentives. 
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different repurchase motivations. The market also responds differently to share repurchase 
announcements accordingly. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, the response to 
positive economic incentives is favorable when share repurchases signal future prospects 
(Comment and Jarrell 1991; Liu and Ziebart 1997; Chen and Wu 2002; Tsai and Kuo 2004; 
Chi, Wu and Tsai 2007). However, this favorable response may be hampered if insiders sell 
shares before the announcements, or when the CEO also serves as a board member or 
chairperson (Chen and Lee 2012). That said, the favorable response may be even more 
pronounced if the corporate governance is strong (Wu 2012b). Sometimes, the executed 
repurchases are far lower than those announced. Therefore, some studies use the completion 
rate (actual repurchases scaled by target shares) to differentiate repurchase motivations. 
Recent studies find that the higher the percentage of the completion rate, the more positive 
the market response (Liu and Chen 2010; Wang and Chen 2010). Kahle (2002) and Chi et al. 
(2007) suggest that if the repurchased shares are intended to be granted to employees, 
investors tend not to respond to it. Chan (2012) contends that the more frequent the share 
repurchases, the weaker the signaling effects. Tsai, Lin and Chih (2012) note that investors 
respond differently to different repurchase price ranges. Liang, Chan, Lai and Wang (2013) 
take into account the lifecycle of the companies. According to their study, if a firm is in the 
growth stage, stock repurchases are mainly for signaling. On the contrary, if a firm is in the 
mature stage, share repurchases may be a response to distribute excess free cash flows and 
limited investment opportunities. 
Regarding the performance following share repurchases, it varies subject to different 
motivations. Some studies document that share prices rise or firm performance improves 
following share repurchases subject to the motivation of undervalued share prices (Barov 
1991; Ikenberry et al 1995; Lie 2005; Peyer and Vermaelen 2009). This conclusion supports 
the signaling hypothesis. However, some studies argue that firm performance declines after 
share repurchases (Nohel and Tarhan 1998; Grullon and Michaely 2004). For example, 
Bhargava (2013) contends that share repurchases reduce available funds and hence 
investment profits, leading to deteriorating performance. On the other hand, Gong, Louis and 
Sun (2008) use return on assets to measure firm performances following share repurchases, 
and do not find any subsequent improvement or decline of firm performance. Chen, Huang 
and Wang (2011) use total factor productivity (instead of return on assets) to validate whether 
share repurchases are in line with the signaling hypothesis or the free cash flow hypothesis. 
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They find that the main purpose of share repurchases is to send a message concerning 
improving a firm’s outlook. This is consistent with the signaling hypothesis.  
Setting aside the different arguments by the information signaling hypothesis and the 
free cash flow hypothesis, the existing literature only verifies whether share repurchase 
announcements are driven by undervalued share prices or a desire to distribute cash flows, 
but ignores whether the CEO equity incentive affects the firm’s positive economic incentive 
of share repurchases. If share repurchases on the basis of firm’s positive economic incentives 
push up share prices, will the CEO equity incentive effect increase the likelihood of managers 
pursuing share repurchases? This paper intends to explore whether a firm’s positive economic 
incentives for share repurchases are subject to the influence of the CEO’s equity incentives. 
In other words, do different levels of CEO equity incentives, in terms of CEO ownership, 
affect whether share repurchases are driven either by undervalued share prices (the signaling 
hypothesis) or an intention to distribute excess cash flows (the free cash flow hypothesis)?  
 
2) Hypothesis Development  
Effects of CEO equity incentives 
The literature suggests that managers’ share ownership can mitigate the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders. A high percentage of share ownership encourages 
managers to work hard, and aligns the interests of managers and those of shareholders 
(Haugen and Senbet 1981). According to this incentive alignment hypothesis, the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers in firms with high equity incentive is less 
apparent (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Holmstrom 1979). However, 
recent theoretical papers suggest that equity incentives may also motivate managers to boost 
short term stock prices by manipulating accounting numbers, which is consistent with the 
opportunistic or entrenchment behavior of CEOs (see for example, Vafeas 1997; Goldman 
and Slezak 2006). 
Prior research finds that CEOs tend to buy back stocks when they hold more stock 
options. Stock repurchase allows CEOs to distribute cash without diluting the EPS of the 
stock when they exercise their options (Fenn and Liang 2001; Kahle 2002; Bens et al. 2003; 
Burns, McTier and Minnick 2015). Jolls (1998), Feng and Liang (2001), and Burns et al. 
(2015) find that firms which have more stock options pay lower dividends. Vafeas (1997) and 
Fried (2005) find that high management ownership increases the likelihood of share 
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repurchases. Kahle (2002) further divided stock options into exercisable and unexercisable, 
and found that the more exercisable stock options that CEOs have, the more likely the 
companies are to announce share repurchases, and the higher the amount of share repurchases. 
However, using Finland and other European firms as sample, Liljeblom and Pasternack (2006) 
and De Cesari and Ozkan (2015) find a statistically insigniﬁcant relationship between 
repurchase activities and CEOs’ stock options. Overall, the extant literature provides unclear 
evidence regarding how CEO equity incentive affects share repurchase policy. Unlike prior 
research using CEO’s stock ownership (or beneficial ownership) as a proxy for equity 
incentives, this study follows Core and Guay (1999) in using the linkage between CEO 
personal wealth and firm value to measure CEO equity incentive (Core and Guay 1999).  
Prior literature suggests that the repurchase announcement usually serves as a positive 
economic signal of benefit to investors reflecting the information signaling (undervaluation) 
hypothesis and free cash flow hypothesis (Liu and Ziebart 1997; Chan et al. 2004; Grullon 
and Michaely 2004; Wu 2012a; Liang et al. 2013). If firm value increases after repurchase, 
CEO personal wealth will increase. CEOs with high equity incentives signify a strong linkage 
between the personal wealth of CEOs and firm value (Fama 1980). Therefore, if CEOs are 
concerned about their equity value, they are motived to promote firm value through share 
repurchase (Amihud and Lev 1981; Walking and Long 1984; Fried 2011), as well as to 
increase the value of their own equity stakes. In accordance with the previous discussion, we 
posit the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: The amount of share repurchases announced increases in tandem with the CEO equity 
incentives.  
 
CEO equity incentive and economic incentive 
Two major hypotheses for repurchasing shares analyzed in past studies are the 
information signaling hypothesis (e.g., Chan et al. 2004; Ikenberry et al. 1995; Lie 2005; 
Peyer and Vermaelen 2009) and the free cash flow hypothesis (e.g., Grullon and Michaely 
2004; Nohel and Tarhan 1998). The information signaling hypothesis states that share 
repurchase announcements are a means of conveying positive information about future 
earnings prospects by reducing information asymmetry (Otchere and Ross 2002). CEOs 
tend to release private information through the share repurchases when the stock is 
9 
 
undervalued (Jagannathan et al. 2000; Baker, Powell and Veit 2003). Investors receive this 
private information and adjust their forecasts about the firm, and the stock price rises. Prior 
research finds that the market responds favorably to the announcement of share repurchases 
when firms are undervalued by the market (Otchere and Ross 2002; Lee, Ejara and Gleason 
2010). If share repurchases deliver the message that share prices are undervalued, the future 
performances of the companies will improve following the share repurchases (e.g., Barov 
1991; Lie 2005; Chen, Huang and Wang 2011). Prior research also suggests that some 
managers under pressure to boost stock prices use buyback announcements to mislead 
investors (Chan et al. 2010; Liu and Swanson 2016). Given that CEOs with high equity 
incentive are more likely to believe their stock is underpriced in general, we would expect 
them to react more to undervalued share price. In sum, the information signaling hypothesis 
suggests that a firm has an incentive to buy back its own shares as a good self-investment 
signal when its stock price is undervalued. Therefore, it can be inferred that in case of 
undervalued share prices, CEOs with high equity incentives are more likely to repurchase 
shares to increase their own personal wealth. Following the literature, we use abnormal 
book to market ratio to measure the level of undervalued price to control the difference 
between repurchase firms and non-repurchase firms (Liang et al. 2013). On the basis of the 
above literature review, this paper posits the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: The relationship between abnormal book-market ratio and share repurchases increases 
with the CEO equity incentives. 
 
 Alternatively, the free cash flow hypothesis suggests that repurchase of shares is a way 
to distribute a firm’s excess cash flow to avoid over-investment (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 
1986). The existence of free cash flows may lead managers to implement poor-performing or 
highly-risky projects in order to safeguard their own interests to the detriment of the firm 
values. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, when firms notice the deteriorating future 
investment opportunities, they will distribute cash flows and use share repurchases in lieu of 
investments to avoid excess investments. Prior studies suggest that repurchases are more 
likely in firms that hold high levels of excess cash (Dittmar, 2000; Mitchell and Dharmawan, 
2007; Andriosopoulos and Hoque 2013). However, if CEOs’ equity incentives are high, the 
linkage between the personal wealth of CEO and firm value is strong, so the agency problem 
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resultant from free cash flows will be mitigated (Haugen and Senbet 1981). That implies 
CEOs’ equity incentive can mitigate the over-investment of free cash flow. Therefore, firms 
with higher equity incentive are less likely to repurchase shares in order to distribute free 
cash flows. This paper expects that firms with CEOs’ high equity incentives can mitigate 
overinvestment problems due to free cash flows, and are less sensitive to excess free cash 
flow when taking repurchase decisions. We posit the following hypothesis:  
  
H2b: The relationship between abnormal cash flows and share repurchases decreases 
with the CEO equity incentives. 
 
Board gender diversity  
According to corporate governance literature, female directorsallocate more effort to 
monitor firms and improve corporate governance (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Zhu, Small and 
Flaherty 2010; Post and Byron 2015). For example, Nielsen and Huse (2010) find that female 
directors increase board effectiveness by reducing the level of board conflict and ensuring a 
high quality of board development activities. Chen, Crossland and Huang (2016) find a 
negative relationship between female directors and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
according to social identity theory. Post and Byron (2015) also show that female board 
representation is positively related to board monitoring activities and board strategy 
involvement due to gender differences in risk aversion and ethical sensitivity. Evgeniou and 
Vermaelen (2017) indicate that board gender diversity increases the likelihood of repurchase 
to reduce agency costs of free cash flow. 
Prior research related to CEOs equity incentives has two competing effects: the interest 
alignment effect (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Holmstrom 1979) and 
the opportunistic effect (or entrenchment effect) (Goldman and Slezak, 2006; Duellman, 
Ahmed and Abdel-Meguid 2013; Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor 2013). 
Duellman et al. (2013) find that the incentive alignment (opportunistic) effect of equity 
incentives increases (decreases) as monitoring intensity increases (decreases). Cheng, 
Harford and Zhang (2015) also find that repurchases are more likely in firms when CEO 
bonus pay is based on EPS. CEOs also attempt to time the market when taking share 
repurchases decisions (Chan et al. 2007). Zhang et al. (2008) also suggest that equity 
incentives lead to incentive misalignment.  
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Given that female directors improve corporate governance (Adams and Ferreira 2009; 
Zhu, Small and Flaherty, 2010; Post and Byron 2015) and have enough time to monitor the 
CEOs, this study expects that the opportunistic effect of equity incentives decreases when 
there are more female directors in the board. Based on the above arguments, we make the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H3: The relationship between the amount of share repurchase announced and CEOs equity 
incentives decreases when there are more female directors on the board. 
 
3. Research Design 
Our main aim is to examine the impact of CEO equity incentive on share repurchases. 
To test the first hypothesis, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions:  
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
6 1 7 1 8 1 9 1 10 1 11 1
_    
                              
                  
it it it it it it
it it it it it it
REPURCHASE H INC ABFCF ABBM SIZE LEVERAGE
PAYOUT RET TENURE FECO DUAL BDSIZE
     
     
    
     
     
     
              iYEARdummy INDUSTRYdummy    
(1)  
The dependent variable, REPURCHASEi,t is the amount of share repurchases, scaled 
by market value at the beginning of the year (multiplied by 100 to report as a percentage) 
(Dittmar 2000; Blouin and Krull 2009; Banyi et al 2008; Liu and Swanson 2016). The 
explanatory variable of primary interest, H_INCi,t-1 is excess CEO equity incentive at the 
beginning of the year. Our H1 predicts that the coefficient of H_INCi,t-1 is positive, or β1>0, 
suggesting that repurchases are more likely in firms with more equity incentive.  
We follow Core and Guay (1999) in the calculation of the CEO equity incentives. 
The incentive effect is quantified as the change in the equity value owned by CEOs for 
each 1% change in share prices. Computing this measure of incentives for stock owned by 
a firm’s CEO is straightforward because stock value increases by 1% for each 1% increase 
in the stock price (Core and Guay 1999). In addition, Core and Guay (1999) indicate that 
equity incentives to CEO are subject to the influence of firm size (lnMV), operational risks 
(RISK) and growth opportunities (GROWTH). Therefore, this paper uses Equation (M1) to 
address the self-selection bias by estimating the optimal equity incentive and compute the 
residuals. Positive residuals mean the incentive is higher than the optimal value, and the 
observations are defined as high incentives. We then define H_INC as 1 if the incentive is 
higher than the optimal value, and zero otherwise. The estimation Equation (M1) is as 
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follows:  
0 1 2 3ln  it it it it iINC MV RISK GROWTH INDUSTRYdummy            (M1) 
 
Equity incentives in the form of CEO ownership (INC) is defined as the number of 
shares held by CEOs during the year multiplied by share prices and divided by 100. Firm 
sizes (lnMV) are computed as the natural logarithm of the market value at the beginning of 
the period, growth opportunity (GROWTH) represented by the market-book ratio (market 
value of equity divide by book value of equity), and operational risks (RISK) measured as the 
residuals in the market returns model. 
Prior literature suggests that the repurchase announcement usually serves as a positive 
economic signal of benefit to investors due to the undervaluation hypothesis and the free cash 
flow hypothesis (Liu and Ziebart 1997; Chan et al. 2004; Grullon and Michaely 2004; Wu 
2012a; Liang et al. 2013). This study thus controls the free cash flow and price 
undervaluation. We follow Liang et al. (2013) to measure the free cash flows as the abnormal 
free cash flows ratio (ABFCF) and price undervaluation as the abnormal book-market ratio 
(ABBM). First, the free cash flows (FCF) are calculated as the cash and cash equivalents 
deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period (Dittmar 2000). To capture the different 
effects between repurchase firms and non-repurchase firms, we then match the repurchase 
sample firm’s FCF with the potential non-repurchase firms that have the same two-digit SIC 
industry. The median value for the FCF in the non-repurchase sample is used as a benchmark. 
The FCF of the firms with share repurchase is deducted with the median FCF of the matched 
sample to derive the abnormal free cash flows ratio (ABFCF). Similar procedures are applied 
to the book-market ratio (ABBM) with the book-market ratio (BM) being the ratio of the book 
value of equity to the market value at the beginning of the year when share repurchases are 
announced (Dittmar 2000).   
This study includes several control variables that are expected to influence the decision 
to repurchase share, as shown in Equation (1), including firm size (SIZE), debt ratio 
(LEVERAGE), payout ratio (PAYOUT) and past stock returns (RET). Firm size (SIZE) is 
measured by the natural log of total assets at the end of year t-1 (De Cesari and Ozkan 2015; 
Liu and Swanson 2016; Chintrakarn, Chatjuthamard, Tong and Jiraporn 2018). Prior studies 
show that information asymmetry is more serious with small firms; hence, small firms are 
more likely to be undervalued and to buy back shares. Debt ratio (LEVERAGE) is total 
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liabilities divided by total assets. It is expected that the lower the debt ratios, the more likely 
share repurchases (De Cesari and Ozkan 2015; Liu and Swanson 2016; Evgeniou and 
Vermaelen 2017; Chintrakarn et al. 2018; Banerjee et al. 2018). However, some research 
suggests a positive relation between leverage and repurchase (e.g., Dittmar 2000). Therefore, 
we do not make a directional prediction about the relationship between leverage and 
repurchase. Dividend yield is measured as cash dividends divided by net incomes. According 
to the substitution hypothesis, the companies buying back shares pay out fewer dividends 
(Liu and Swanson 2016). Finally, Ikenberry et al. (1995) suggest that undervaluation of share 
prices is often a result of poor share price performance in the past. Therefore, this paper 
measures share performance with the stock returns (RET) before share repurchase 
announcements, and expects that the lower the stock returns before share repurchases, the 
more likely the announcements of share repurchases. RET is the raw stock return in the 
previous fiscal year (De Cesari and Ozkan 2015; Evgeniou and Vermaelen 2017; Banerjee et 
al. 2018) 
In addition, the CEO-level characteristics can also inﬂuence risk-taking tendencies, 
affecting the CEOs’ incentive to repurchase shares. We also control for CEO-level 
characteristics as well, including CEO tenure (EARLY) (Simsek 2007; Ali and Zhang 2015), 
female CEO (FCEO) (a dummy variable indicating that the CEO was female) and duality 
(DUAL) (the percentage of firm shares held by the CEO). We use an indicator variable that 
equals one for firm-years that correspond to the first three years of service of the firm’s CEO 
(EARLY) as a proxy for experience and potential horizon problems (Ali and Zhang 2015), and 
zero otherwise. Activist shareholders have argued for the separation of the board chair and 
CEO, and a number of empirical studies suggest that agency problems are higher when the 
CEO is also the board chair (e.g., Yermack 1996). We define the dual Chair/CEO (DUAL) as 
an indicator variable, which is equal to one if the board chair is also the CEO, and zero 
otherwise. In addition, we include board size (BDSIZE), the number of directors, to control 
for governance conditions. All variables are summarized in Appendix A. 
In Equation (1), all the independent variables, including CEO equity incentive, are 
measured at the beginning of the year to reduce concerns about endogeneity and potential 
revere causality (Burns et al. 2015; De Cesari and Ozkan 2015). We also include industry 
dummy variables (industry effects) using the two-digit SIC code level and year dummy 
variables (year effects) to control for possible variation over time and across industries. All 
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continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level on each tail to alleviate the influence of 
outliers. We adjust standard errors from regressions for the clustering effect at the firm level 
(Petersen 2009). 
Most studies focus on whether the self-interest motivation of managers and economic 
incentives separately affect share repurchases without delving into whether managers’ 
self-interest motivation affects economic incentives in companies’ repurchase decision. This 
paper further examines whether different levels of CEO equity incentives affect the economic 
incentives related to share repurchases.  
We examine two economic incentives (i.e., undervaluation and free cash flows) of share 
repurchases potentially affected by CEO equity incentive. H2a expects that high equity 
incentive CEOs are more sensitive to a firm’s undervalued stock. We capture this by linking 
the CEO equity incentive variables (H_INC) with the firms’ undervaluation (ABBM) over the 
prior year. To test this hypothesis, we add the interaction variables of H_INC*ABBM in 
Equation (2). H2a predicts that a positive relation between abnormal BM ratio 
(undervaluation) and the amount of repurchase is more pronounced in firms with high CEO 
equity incentives, resulting in the coefficient of the interaction term H_INC*ABBM (β4) > 0. 
On the other hand, H2b states that the lower equity incentive weakens the share repurchase 
economic incentive on the free cash flow distribution. Hence, the coefficient of interaction of 
H_INC*ABFCF (β5) is negative or insignificant. To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate the 
following cross-sectional regressions: 
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Hypothesis 3 expects that the opportunistic effect of equity incentives decreases when 
there are more female directors on the board. We add GENDER and GENDER*H_INC in 
Equation (3) to test H3. GENDER is the percentage of female directors on the board, which is 
used as a measure of gender diversity (Evgeniou and Vermaelen 2017). We also use an 
alternative measure such as a dummy variable for the presence of female directors on the 
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board.
6
 The negative coefficient of interaction term of GENDER*H_INC implies that female 
directors mitigate the opportunistic effect of CEO equity incentives. To test hypothesis 3, we 
estimate the following cross-sectional regressions:  
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2) Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 The sample was drawn from Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and Taipei 
Exchange (TPEx) listed companies (excluding financial industries) from 2002 to 2016. 
Share repurchases, CEO equity incentives, board gender, share prices and financial data 
were all taken from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) databases. A total of 2,789 share 
repurchase announcements were made during 2002 to 2016. After eliminating the financial 
data that we were unable to determine, the final sample comprised 2,478 share repurchases. 
Table 1 reports the repurchase announcements by industry and year classification from 2002 
through 2016. The number of share repurchases ranges from 64 to 420 during the sample 
period. The number in 2008, 420, is more than twice as high as in other years. This may be a 
response to the global financial crisis in 2008, as more companies sought to protect 
shareholders’ rights with share repurchases. In terms of industry distribution, the electronics 
industry, which is the largest group, accounts for 68% of the sample (with 1,688 companies 
out of 2,478).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Empirical Results Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sample. The mean of the value of 
repurchased shares deflated with the market capitalization at the beginning of the period 
(REPURCHASE) is 0.017, indicating that the value of repurchased shares accounts for an 
average of 1.7% of the market value. The average share repurchase amount is NT$170 million. 
The average H_INC is 0.607, implying that 60% of repurchase firms have significantly higher 
                                                 
6
 We also use the number of female directors in the board as the measure, yielding essentially similar results. 
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CEO equity incentive. The mean of abnormal free cash flow (ABFCF) for repurchase 
companies is 0.025, suggesting that repurchase companies possess significantly higher 
abnormal free cash flows. This is consistent with literature arguing that free cash flows 
motivate share repurchases. The mean of the abnormal book-market ratio (ABBM) of the 
repurchase companies is 0.111. This shows that the repurchase firms have high abnormal 
book-market ratio and their market value is undervalued. This is in line with literature 
suggesting undervalued share prices are a motivation for share repurchases. Meanwhile, the 
repurchase firms report lower debt ratios (LEVERAGE) and these companies are larger in 
SIZE.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the 
multivariate analyses. Repurchase amount (REPURCHASE) appears to be highly correlated 
with CEO equity incentive (H_INC) and abnormal book-market ratio (ABBM). The 
correlation coefficients between control variables are generally small in magnitude. The 
largest correlation is between ABBM and RET (0.49), which is less than 0.7. In addition, as 
the VIF statistics for all explanatory variables never exceed 5.0 in any regression model, 
multicollinearity may not be a serious concern in our study (Zeng and Wang 2015). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2 Effect of equity incentives on repurchase 
Table 4 reports the results of the relation between CEO equity incentive and share 
buyback. Column (1) shows the results of the economics incentives on repurchase with 
adjusted R-squares 0.108. The coefficient of abnormal free cash flows (ABFCF) is 0.003 at 
the 10% significance level, suggesting that the higher the abnormal free cash flows, the larger 
the value of share repurchases. This result supports the free cash flow hypothesis that firms 
use share repurchases as a means of distributing free cash flows. The coefficient of abnormal 
book-market ratio (ABBM) is also significantly positive (coefficient=0.008 with p<0.01). This 
is consistent with the information signaling hypothesis that firm undervaluation motivates 
share repurchases.  
Regarding the control variables, the signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient of LEVERAGE 
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shown in column (1) (coefficient =0.008 with p< 0.01) suggests that the repurchase amounts 
increase with a firm’s leverage, which is consistent with prior research (Dittmar 2000). The 
coefﬁcient of PAYOUT is signiﬁcantly negative (-0.000 with p<0.1), indicating that the 
repurchase firms pay less cash dividend, which is consistent with Evgeniou and Vermaelen 
2017. The coefﬁcient of SIZE is signiﬁcantly negative (-0.002 with p<0.01), indicating that 
the repurchase amount is lower in large firms. Given that the coefﬁcient of RET is 
signiﬁcantly negative (-0.052 with p<0.1), firms with lower stock returns tend to repurchase 
shares. Finally, with signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient of BDSIZE (-0.005 with p<0.05), 
repurchases are less likely in firms with larger board size. In sum, the results in column (1) 
document the signaling and free cash flows motivation in our sample. 
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the results of both the economic incentives and the equity 
incentives on repurchases. We find the coefficient of H_INC to be signiﬁcant and positive 
(coefficient=0.001, p<0.05). This indicates that firms are more likely to repurchase stocks 
when the CEO has higher equity incentive. This result provides strong support to H1 that 
CEOs who want to increase firm value and their personal benefit have the motivation for 
repurchasing stocks.  
To test H2, we added the interaction terms H_INC *ABBM and H_INC *ABFCF. H2a 
predicts that the positive relation between abnormal BM ratio (undervaluation) and the 
amount of repurchase is more pronounced in firms with high CEO equity incentives. The 
results in column (3) show that the coefficient of H_INC is still significantly positive. In 
addition, the coefficient of H_INC*ABBM is 0.002 (p<0.1). The evidence supports H2a that 
strong equity incentives strengthen the share repurchase economic motivation when share 
prices are undervalued. On the other hand, the coefficient of H_INC*ABFCF is insignificant, 
meaning that the CEOs with high equity incentive are not sensitive to the firm’s abnormal free 
cash flows. Overall, this paper finds that CEOs with high equity incentives have larger 
propensity to buy back stocks. However, this larger propensity exists especially when the 
firms’ stock is undervalued. Having higher excess cash flows will not motivate CEOs with 
high equity incentives to decide to repurchase stocks. These results suggest that the CEO 
equity incentives intervenes the economic incentives of share repurchases documented in 
prior studies.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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4.3 Effect of female director in the board 
To test H3, that the effect of equity incentive on shares repurchase will be weaker when 
the firms are monitored by more female directors in the board, we captured this by interacting 
the CEO equity incentive variable with the female directors on the board, based on the 
strength of internal monitoring by female directors. Table 5 reports the results.  
We used two measures of board gender diversity: GENDER (the percentage of directors 
on the board who are female) and GENDERDM (1 if there is at least one female director on 
the board, 0 otherwise) (Chen, Crossland and Huang 2016; Evgniou and Vermaelen 2017). In 
column (1) of Table 5, we used the percentage of directors on the board who are female 
(GENDER). The coefficient of GENDER is positive and significant, indicating that 
repurchases occur more often in firms with a higher percentage of female directors on the 
board, which is consistent with prior research (Evgeniou and Vermaelen 2017). In addition, 
the interaction term GENDER*H_INC has a coefficient of -0.009 (p-value = 0.010). The 
evidence suggests that the effect of equity incentive on repurchase is weaker when firms have 
more female directors on the board, and have more incentives to monitor CEOs’ 
opportunistic behavior related to share repurchase. In column (2) of Table 5, we add two 
interaction terms: GENDER*H_INC*ABFCF and GENDER*H_INC*ABBM. We also find 
that the coefficient of GENDER*H_INC*ABBM is negative and significant, which means that 
the positive relation between equity incentive and abnormal BM ratio (undervaluation 
motivation) would be mitigated when firms have a higher percentage of female directors on 
their boards. 
When using GENDERDM to measure board gender diversity, columns (3) and (4) show 
similar results. Therefore, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the prediction of H3, that 
more female directors on the board represents stronger governance mechanism and decreases 
the opportunistic behavior of CEOs.  
  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using a sample of the Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange listed companies 
from 2002 to 2016, this study investigated the effects of both CEO equity incentives and 
economic incentives on shares repurchase, and further examined the role of board gender 
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diversity. The evidence suggests that without considering CEO equity incentives, firms buy 
back shares due to abnormal free cash flows and/or undervalued share prices. This is 
consistent with prior studies and supports both the free cash flow hypothesis and the 
information signaling hypothesis. However, when considering the CEOs equity incentives, 
consistent with our hypotheses, CEOs with higher equity incentives are more likely to buy 
back shares, in particularly, when the stock is undervalued. This implies that CEO equity 
incentive affects the economic motivation of repurchase share, and suggests that CEOs with 
high equity incentive are more sensitive to firm value, but not free cash flows. We also find 
that the effect of CEOs equity incentives on shares repurchase decreases with board gender 
diversity, which is consistent with the governance hypothesis that a stronger governance 
mechanism mitigates the CEOs’ opportunistic behavior related to buying back shares in order 
to increase their personal wealth.  
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Table1  
Distribution of observations.  
Industry/Year  02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total 
                 
Cement 2 1 1 3 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 17 
Food 3 3 4 4 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 21 
Plastics 0 0 5 7 5 4 10 3 1 2 1 0 3 6 2 49 
Textiles 5 5 10 6 5 4 15 9 3 9 3 5 3 6 1 89 
Electric, Machinery 10 10 13 6 5 7 17 6 3 13 9 2 6 10 5 122 
Appliance, Cable 4 1 1 2 1 0 4 1 1 1 0 0 1 3 1 21 
Chemical 4 5 12 5 5 1 14 3 1 13 4 2 8 20 10 107 
Glass, Ceramics 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 7 
Paper, Pulp 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 16 
Steel, Iron 1 0 3 6 4 1 10 3 0 5 9 2 4 9 5 62 
Rubber 0 1 2 2 2 1 3 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 19 
Automobile 0 2 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 14 
Electronics 51 71 176 108 105 124 296 55 48 166 90 56 58 187 97 1,688 
Construction 10 4 8 7 6 6 13 2 2 10 6 2 11 9 8 104 
Transportation 1 0 1 1 0 1 5 3 1 1 2 1 1 4 3 25 
Tourism 0 2 1 1 0 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 2 3 3 19 
Trading and consumers' Goods 3 5 4 3 1 3 5 1 1 3 2 1 1 4 1 38 
Other 3 3 4 5 1 1 12 5 2 7 4 2 1 6 4 60 
                 
total 98 114 249 168 143 160 420 94 64 237 134 74 102 275 146 2,478 
Table 1 reports the repurchase announcements by year and industry classification from 2002 through 2016. 
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Table 2 
 Descriptive Statistics (n=2,478) 
 
 Mean  Median SD p25 p75 Min  Max  
Repamount 
(NT$ million) 
170 39 1209 16 98 0.000 484677 
REPURCHASE 0.017 0.013 0.018 0.006 0.023 0.000 0.251 
H_INC 0.607 1.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
ABFCF 0.025 -0.010 0.120 -0.049 0.056 -0.114 1.118 
ABBM 0.111 -0.001 0.537 -0.259 0.358 -0.894 4.900 
LEVERAGE 0.351 0.351 0.153 0.233 0.459 0.003 0.851 
PAYOUT 1.566 0.359 20.131 0.000 0.823 -18.944 864.182 
SIZE 15.336 15.147 1.236 14.477 16.054 12.424 20.129 
RET -0.000 -0.002 0.006 -0.004 0.001 -0.009 0.080 
GENDER 0.136 0.111 0.129 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.750 
EARLY 0.078 0.000 0.269 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DUAL 0.358 0.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
FCEO 0.034 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BDSIZE 9.362 9.000 2.089 8.000 10.000 4.000 32.000 
1. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Table 3  
Correlation between variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) REPURCHASE 1.00             
(2) H_INC 0.07*** 1.00            
(3) ABFCF -0.03 0.00 1.00           
(4) ABBM 0.24*** 0.01 -0.22*** 1.00          
(5) LEVERAGE 0.03 0.02 -0.23*** -0.05*** 1.00         
(6) PAYOUT -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.04** 0.01 1.00        
(7) SIZE -0.12*** -0.30*** -0.18*** 0.08*** 0.23*** 0.02 1.00       
(8) RET 0.21*** -0.08*** 0.05** 0.49*** -0.03 -0.04* 0.00 1.00      
(9) GENDER 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.07*** -0.01 1.00     
(10) EARLY 0.00 -0.07*** -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04** -0.02 -0.02 1.00    
(11) DUAL 0.03 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 -0.06*** -0.03 -0.13*** 0.02 0.11*** -0.08*** 1.00   
(12) FCEO -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.07*** 0.01 0.17*** -0.02 -0.04* 1.00  
(13) BDSIZE -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.22*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.05** -0.10*** 0.03 1.00 
1. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
2.***, **, and * indicate statistical significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4 Equity incentive and motivation of repurchase  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
   
    
Intercept      0.066*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABFCF 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 
 
(0.055) (0.059) (0.146) 
ABBM 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
H_INC  0.001** 0.001* 
 
 (0.015) (0.065) 
H_INC*ABFCF   0.001 
 
  (0.129) 
H_INC*ABBM   0.002* 
 
  (0.057) 
LEVERAGE 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
PAYOUT -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** 
 
(0.096) (0.041) (0.023) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RET -0.052* -0.010 -0.028 
 
(0.092) (0.718) (0.348) 
EARLY 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.583) (0.793) (0.611) 
DUAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.854) (0.823) (0.683) 
FCEO 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.929) (0.940) (0.919) 
BDSIZE -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** 
 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.030) 
Year dummy Controlled  Controlled Controlled 
Industry dummy Controlled Controlled Controlled 
    
N 2,478 2,478 2,478 
adj. R
2
 0.108 0.105 0.107 
1. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
2. Coefﬁcient estimates are reported with p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1 percent and 
99 percent levels. This table presents the regression results from Equations (1) and (2). The coefﬁcient estimates 
are based on ﬁrm clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). 
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Table 5 Effect of Board gender diversity on equity incentive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  0.050*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GENDER*H_INC -0.009** -0.007**   
 (0.010) (0.049)   
GENDER*H_INC*ABFCF  -0.003   
  (0.844)   
GENDER*H_INC*ABBM  -0.023***   
  (0.000)   
GENDER 0.007** 0.008**   
 (0.026) (0.015)   
GENDERDM*H_INC   -0.001** -0.001** 
   (0.014) (0.038) 
GENDERDM*H_INC* ABFCF    -0.001 
    (0.895) 
GENDERDM*H_INC* ABBM    -0.008** 
    (0.025) 
GENDERDM   0.001* 0.001** 
   (0.098) (0.030) 
H_INC 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.040) (0.006) (0.030) (0.041) 
H_INC*ABFCF  0.002  0.005 
  (0.333)  (0.272) 
H_INC*ABBM  0.005***  0.008** 
  (0.001)  (0.017) 
ABFCF 0.003** 0.001 0.003** 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.425) (0.047) (0.732) 
ABBM 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.007** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.006) (0.009) 
PAYOUT -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.037) (0.005) (0.024) (0.011) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RET 0.068** 0.063** -0.041 -0.046 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.169) (0.129) 
EARLY 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.724) (0.822) (0.441) (0.557) 
DUAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.728) (0.716) (0.786) (0.700) 
FCEO -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.955) (0.874) (0.905) (0.999) 
BDSIZE -0.004** -0.004** -0.006** -0.005** 
 (0.030) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) 
Year dummy Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Industry dummy Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
     
N 2,478 2,478 2,478 2,478 
adj. R
2
 0.094 0.100 0.104 0.111 
1. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
2. Coefﬁcient estimates are reported with p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels; respectively. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1 percent and 
99 percent levels. This table presents the regression results from Equation (3). The coefﬁcient estimates are 
based on ﬁrm clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). 
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Appendix A Variable definitions 
Variables  Description  
Dependent variable 
REPURCHASE Repurchase amount The dollar amount of repurchases divided by the prior 
year end market value of equity (Dittmar 2000; Haw, 
Ho, Hu and Zhang 2011).  
Independent variables 
ABFCF Abnormal free cash 
flows 
Free cash flow ratios of the repurchase companies 
minus the median of the free cash ratios of the 
companies in the matched sample. Free cash flow ratios 
are cash and cash equivalents deflated by total assets at 
the beginning of the period. Median of the cash free 
flow ratios is calculated from the companies in the 
same industry which do not repurchase shares. 
 
ABBM Abnormal 
book-market ratio 
Book-market ratios of the repurchase companies minus 
the median of the ratios in the matched sample.  
Book-market ratios are book value of ordinary shares 
divided by market capitalization at the beginning of the 
quarter when share repurchase announcements are 
made. The matched sample comprises of the 
non-repurchase companies in the same industry. 
INC CEO’s holding of 
equity incentive 
We define equity incentives as the change in the dollar 
value of the CEO’ s stock for a 1% change in the stock 
price.  
log[No. of shares holding * year-end share price/100] 
H_INC High equity 
incentives 
H_INC=1 if the residualfrom equation (M1) is positive, 
otherwise H_INC=0. 
GENDER  Board gender 
diversity 
The percentage of directors on the board who are 
female (the number of female directors in a given 
firm-year divided by total board size).  
GENDERDM  An indicator variable, which is equal to one 1 if there is 
at least one female director in the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
Control variables   
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEVERAGE Debt ratio Total debt divided by total assets. 
PAYOUT Dividend yield Cash dividends divided by net income. 
EARLY  An indicator variable that equals one for firm-years that 
correspond to the first three years of service of the 
firm’s CEO. 
FCEO  A dummy variable indicating that the CEO was female, 
and zero otherwise. 
DUAL  An indicator variable, which is equal to one if the board 
chair is also the CEO, and zero otherwise. 
BDSIZE  Number of directors. 
YEARdummy  Dummy variable for years. 
INDUSTRYdummy  Dummy variable for industries. 
Equation (M1) independent variables 
lnMV Market value Natural logarithm of market value at the beginning of 
the period.  
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RISK Operational risks Residuals of the market model.  
GROWTH Growth opportunity  Market-to-book ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
